

Education Reform under the American Occupation (1)

—Report of the United States Education Mission to Japan
and the Reform of the School System—

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
Introduction

With the ending of World War II, Japan immediately came under the Occupation of the Allied Powers. In order to remove the wartime leaders of Japanese education and to eliminate militaristic and ultranationalistic influences, the General Headquarters of the Allied Powers issued the four negative directives for educational reforms. At the same time, in September 1945, the Civil Information and Education Section (CI&E) of the General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (GHQ/SCAP), planned to invite U.S. specialists in education to form a United States Education Mission to Japan to reconstruct postwar Japanese education with positive reforms. In order to organize the Mission, CI&E received cooperation from Japanese educators such as Tamon Maeda, the Minister of Education.

As to appointing a chairman for the Mission, it has been confirmed that the first candidate, who was James B. Conant, the President of Harvard University, was officially rejected by General Douglas MacArthur for being a "politically inappropriate choice of chairman." Consequently, GHQ/CI&E removed Conant from the chairmanship and from the list of candidates for the Education Mission to Japan. ¹⁾

On January 4th 1946, after a partial revision of the list had been made, the U.S. War Department was officially requested to send the Mission to Japan under the authority of the Department of State. The Department of State selected George D. Stoddard, New York State Commissioner of Education and recently elected President of the University of Illinois, as chairman on the recommendations of William Benton, Assistant Secretary of State, John W. Studebaker, U.S. Commissioner of Education, U.S. Office of Education, and others. The Department of State and George D. Stoddard together organized the United States Education Mission to Japan, USEMJ. They selected 27 educators and educational administrators as members, including such distinguished pedagogues as G. S. Counts and I. L. Kandel from Columbia University. ²⁾

The Mission arrived in Japan in the beginning of March 1946 and stayed about one month in order to study Japanese education, talk with Japanese educators and confer with the Japanese Education Committee. They then prepared the *Report of the U.S. Education Mission to Japan*, and submitted it to the Su-



The Member of the First United States Education Mission to Japan, March 1946 [The Henry Suzzallo Library, University of Washington]

preme Commander for the Allied Powers, Tokyo, on March 30th 1946. The Report was made public on April 7 of the same year. The Report contained a statement of approval from General MacArthur, and as a result, it established the general policy for educational reform in Japan. Officially, the Report was only a recommendation, but it served as a practical guide for postwar educational reform in Japan.

As is generally known, Chapter III "Administration of Primary and Secondary School Education" of the *Report of the U. S. Education Mission to Japan*, officially recommended that the prewar multi-track school system be unified and changed into a 6-3-3 school system, extending compulsory education to nine years, making schools co-educational, and establishing comprehensive high schools. However, the exact circumstances that led to the final recommendations in the Report have not only remained unclear due to restrictions on access to material, but there are many views concerning these circumstances, among them the idea that the recommendations "forced" upon the Japanese by the American Occupation. In fact, former Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka clearly claimed on the nationwide television on April 28, 1974 that the 6-3-3 school system had been imposed on the Japanese by the American Occupation.

Former Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone set up the National Council on Educational Reform under his direct control in September 1984. The Council's final report reflected the opinion that the school system had been forced to change under the direction of the American Occupation and that the 6-3-3-4 school system was not suited to Japanese society. He further claimed that these factors accounted for the present "state of dilapidation" of education, and that it was necessary to "balance the books" on the 40 years of postwar Japanese education.

The present study uses not only the "Trainor Papers" and "Stoddard Papers" but also the "Wanamaker Papers," which were not made public before, as well as interviews held over the past few years by the author as part of a study sponsored by the Ministry of Education Scientific Research Fund for Overseas Study, with some of the members of the Education Mission who had come to Japan: Ernest R. Hilgard; Pearl A. Wanamaker; representative of State Department Gordon T. Bowles who was born in Japan and well acquainted with Japanese education, and who is thought to have played a key role in writing the Report on the basis of his position in the Mission as an advisor; and Herbert J. Wunderlich and Mark T. Orr of the CI&E Education Division, who were in charge of preparations for the arrival of the Mission to Japan and cooperated with the Mission

during its stay in Japan. 3)

Based on previously unstudied documents and interviews of the above people, the circumstances and specific processes by which the 6-3-3 school system was introduced are examined.

I. Draft of School System Reform by the Report of Subcommittee III of the Education Mission

At a meeting held in Guam just before their arrival in Japan, Chairman Stoddard indicated four areas of studies on Japanese education, appointed a chairman for each, and requested that a report be presented by each of the four subcommittees.

Studies of problems in the school system were made by Subcommittee III, "Primary and Secondary School Administration" with A. J. Stoddard as chairman, Kermit Eby, Willard E. Givens, F. Hochwalt, Ethelbert Norton and Pearl A. Wanamaker as members of the committee, and Charles Iglehart as advisor. This subcommittee completed a 25-page report on March 23 of which 30 copies were made, as recorded in the journal "Tokyo and Return" by Givens who was in charge of keeping records⁴⁾: The existence of Subcommittee III report on the issue of the school system was known, but its whereabouts had not been made clear. The report can be found only in the "Wanamaker Papers," stored in the archives of the Henry Suzzallo Library at the University of Washington.



A. J. Stoddard as chairman and Pearl A. Wanamaker of Subcommittee III of the U. S. Education Mission at a Japanese primary school in Tokyo [The Henry Suzzallo Library, University of Washington]

Subcommittee III's recommendation in the report on the postwar school system will be examined as follows:

It comes as a surprise to learn that in fact, Subcommittee III did not endorse the 6-3-3 school system, but instead recommended that the recently restored Japanese prewar school system, the 6-5 system, be continued. It was not simply a matter of preserving the existing school system; the recommendation was based on preliminary meetings in Washington, D.C. with government officials and preparatory proceedings in Hawaii and Guam, and rested on the policy of preserving the traditional Japanese school system while taking steps towards its democratization. That is, Subcommittee III's report made the following recommendations. 5)

The six year elementary school should be entirely free and attendance

compulsory. No form of tuition should be charged. The program of instruction should be such as to prepare children to become healthy, active, thinking citizens eager to develop all of their innate abilities and to be prepared to take their places in a society that is becoming more and more free.

We are convinced that girls are the equal of boys mentally. We therefore recommend that schools be conducted on a co-educational basis. We recommend that the *five-year middle schools be made easily available to all the girls and boys on a co-educational basis and that they be free from all tuition costs to children. We recommend that attendance of all children be compulsory during the first three years.* (Italics mine)

Here it is stated clearly that the 6-5 school system must be made free of tuition and co-educational with 9 years compulsory education. ⁶⁾

II. *The Trend in the Ministry of Education Toward Reimplementation of the 6-5 School System*

Now the question arises as to why Subcommittee III recommended the 6-5 school system. Actually, there were active movements for reform of the school system by the Japanese as well, just preceding the arrival of the Mission. Of course, the 6-5 school system preceded the implementation of the Secondary School Ordinance (four years of secondary school) of January 21, 1943.

On January 30, 1946, Tadasuke Yamazaki, undersecretary of the Ministry of Education, reformed the wartime ordinance and reported to the CI&E that the old five-year secondary school and three-year high school system would be resurrected and that a budget estimate had been drawn up. ⁷⁾ Such active movement by the Ministry of Education led to the amendment of February 23 of the same year, Imperial Ordinance 102 of "Revision of Secondary Schools," changing the "four years" to "five years," and implementing the 6-5 school system on the same day. On the 23rd, the CI&E Education Division records that the prewar school system was reinstated by an Imperial Ordinance from the Ministry of Education. ⁸⁾ In other words, the Mission arrived in Japan just after the reimplementation of the 6-5 school system.

III. *The Mission's Basic Policy on the Reform of the School System*

The background of the Mission's recommendation in favor of the 6-5 school system may be found in its attitude towards reform of the school system at the time of its arrival in Japan.

The basic policy of the United States towards postwar Japan was reflected in the provision in the Potsdam Declaration which stated "The Japanese government shall remove all obstacles to the revival and strengthening of democratic tendencies among the Japanese people;" the people in charge of policy-making

on the U. S. side held the opinion that democratic tendencies did exist in prewar Japan and considered the "revival and strengthening" of such tendencies the most important priority. It was only natural that the Mission's attitude would be along the same lines as this basic policy. In fact, the opening of the paper "Necessary Adjustments," in which Subcommittee III endorses the 6-5 school system, states: "The form and structure of the school system of Japan should be changed so as to promote democratic tendencies." Furthermore, Assistant Secretary of State William Benton, who was responsible for organizing the Mission, had advised that "their task was primarily to provide ideas and suggest ways in which the goals of the Allies as expressed in the Potsdam Declaration could be realized" before the Mission left Washington.⁹⁾

Hugh Borton, who held a central position in the formulation of American policy toward postwar Japanese education, also wrote a memorandum, "The Educational System in Japan,"¹⁰⁾ in which he summed up the Potsdam Declaration as the reorganization, expansion, and utilization of Japanese education to make possible the elimination of elements obstructive to the teaching of democracy, and incorporating desirable changes to enable assistance and contribution, which make possible the realization of the nation's basic goals. As specific reforms to achieve this objective, increase in equal opportunity for education, increase in the number of secondary and higher educational institutions, decentralization of the educational system, and co-education, are set forth clearly. Also, in recommending such changes he warns that coercion by the Americans is undesirable because educational reforms in Japan will not be permanent unless the Japanese themselves act on the belief that it is a desirable reform. Therefore, changes must be made in a way acceptable to the Japanese as much as possible.

The policy of laying stress on the initiative of the Japanese was supported unanimously by the policy-makers in Washington at the time. At the Washington meeting (February 18, 1946) where Colonel F. T. Spaulding (former chief of education, Bureau of Information and Education, War Department) gave Mission members the latest information from Tokyo as background knowledge, he gives his opinion as follows.¹¹⁾

The policy has been to make use of the Japanese themselves in making necessary reforms rather than trying to insert those reforms regardless of the Japanese... there are many phases of the Japanese educational system which during the war have been used with extreme potency for propagandistic purposes which might be used with equal potency to democratic ends. It would therefore be of much interest to you to consider whether it would be possible to reconvert the Japanese education system rather than to do away with it and put in another.

From this, it can be seen that the guidelines of the Mission were considered within the framework of the Potsdam Declaration. The execution of the article

of the Potsdam Declaration meant respect for Japanese independence and assistance to it. This meant that the Mission was not to one-sidedly give recommendations on school system reform, but that its role was to be an indirect one of assisting the Japanese.

The CI&E also faithfully adhered to the articles of the Potsdam Declaration. The foreword of the information manual edited by the CI&E for members of the Mission, *Education in Japan*, begins by quoting the articles of the Potsdam Declaration.¹²⁾

The Mission stopped over in Hawaii on their way to Japan on March 1, 1946 to receive an orientation on Japanese education by "pro-Japanese" Americans and Japanese-Americans. These are the so-called "Hawaiian Notes." The most noteworthy suggestion here was made by Gilbert Bowles, Sr. (father of Mission member Gordon T. Bowles), a missionary in prewar Japan, in his "Notes on the Reconstruction of the Japanese Education System."¹³⁾ He hints that the Mission should recommend the 6-5 school system. Furthermore, Givens, the official editor of Subcommittee III report, stated at the press conference in Hawaii that the position of the Mission as follows: "You cannot impose an educational system on anybody... How Japan administers her schools must be decided by her people."¹⁴⁾

What then was the understanding of the Mission members who made the actual recommendation? First, Bowles of the Department of State, in a key position and well informed about the Japanese school system, testifies that "my understanding was that problems relating to matters of policy such as what kind of school system should be recommended, were not the concern of the Mission." Again, in the writing of the report, Ernest R. Hilgard, thought to have held an influential position on the school system issue, states that "the Mission took the attitude that they should not interfere in school system reform. Such issues should have been decided on by the Japanese."

Pearl A. Wanamaker, who was directly involved in the writing of Subcommittee III report and who had possession of the report, replied in answer to the question about why the recommendation for the 6-5 school system was made, "the Mission was not very concerned about whether the school system should be the 6-5 system or 6-3-3 system but rather how to make the content of the system more democratic."

As can be seen from the above, the Mission made the recommendation for the existing 6-5 school system based on the policy stated in the Potsdam Declaration, which was to encourage the initiative of the Japanese themselves. Also the CI&E seems to have looked favorably on the resurrection of the 6-5 school system by the Ministry of Education. Furthermore, its call for nine-years of compulsory education, tuition free and co-educational, fulfilled democratic goals.

IV. *School System Reform As Set Out in the Final Report—The Change From the 6-5 to the 6-3-3 School System*

Subcommittee III "Report" was written and submitted on March 23, 1946, while the official report of the Mission was completed March 30; this means that the Mission changed its position from favoring a 6-5 school system to actually recommending a 6-3-3 school system in one week. How did this change happen?

First, in looking at the schedule for the Mission's stay in Japan, the first week (March 7 to 14) was spent in orientation on Japanese education, mainly in the form of lectures by the staff of the CI&E Education Division; but after March 16, during the period of completion of the Report, no official meetings were scheduled. During the final six-day period of consideration of the content of the report, from March 20 to 25, discussion meetings were held between Mission members and education specialists from the Japanese Education Committee. These last six days figure importantly in the process of change from the 6-5 to the 6-3-3 school system.

On March 21, Shigeru Nambara, chairman of the Japanese Education Committee, met secretly with Mission Chairman G. D. Stoddard. The minutes of this meeting are recorded in a typed eleven-page report titled "Special Report by Shigeru Nambara, President, Tokyo Imperial University and Chairman of Japanese Education Committee to G. D. Stoddard, March 21, 1946."¹⁵⁾ The two met as equals and as educators. Not only was there a complete lack of any regard for their different positions, one as conqueror, the other conquered, but Nambara even criticized sharply the censorship policy of the SCAP at the time, which reflects their close relationship. Nambara freely expressed his opinions on educational problems and on the reform of the Japanese educational system. "Model the whole scheme after the American plan, building up elementary schools, high schools, colleges, and universities in a natural sequence with wide opportunities at all levels," he said suggesting that the American style of single-track school system be introduced. Further, he even says, "The reforms above are being planned, but Mombusho is hesitating on this. I regard these reforms as crucial, otherwise a revision of the clique system is impossible." Actually, Nambara's thinking can be seen in the statement, "If Japanese education from the Meiji era incorporated many elements from European systems such as Germany and France, then it is only a natural process, indeed a necessity that American system be incorporated anew in this reform."¹⁶⁾

On the Japan side, the records of the movement towards the 6-3-3 school system can be seen in the "Report of Committee No. 3 Concerning Youth Schools et al."¹⁷⁾ thought to have been written by Subcommittee III of the Japanese Education Committee. The report points out at the beginning, "The improvement and expansion of youth schools is of the utmost importance as they are the educational institutions of the people at large" and then recommends as follows:

The present educational system will be completely changed as follows: the elementary school course will cover six years and the secondary school course will last for six years, which will be divided into two stages, three years for each of them and all schools of the same level such as middle schools, girls' high schools, vocational schools will be included in this category, and youth schools will also come under this category.

Again, on the morning of March 25, when the final discussion with the Mission was held, Taketoshi Yamagiwa (Principal of Nishida Kokumin Gakko, Tokyo) presented a report titled "The Problems of Elementary School Education"¹⁸⁾ and touched on school system reform, stating:

Our elementary school education is compulsory, the law requiring 8 years of school for every child in Japan, but enforcement of the last two years has been postponed because of the war. We wish to revise this system as follows: six years of elementary school and 3 years of junior high are compulsory. Moreover, in the three years of junior high school the curriculum should be the same for all pupils, regardless of what they will take up later—commercial, agricultural, or preparatory courses for higher institutions of learning.

As reasons, he cites the rise of the cultural level of Japanese people, the difficulty of choosing a future career at the age of 12, and the elimination of entrance examination pressure. There was active discussion of Yamagiwa's report and Chairman Stoddard asked questions on problems of tuition fees and coeducation and Compton about tuition for junior high school. At four o'clock p. m. on the same day, Shigeru Nambara and Yasaka Takagi (Professor at Tokyo Imperial University) met with Robert K. Hall of the CI&E and presented a report titled "Education Reform—Official Version of Japanese Education Committee."¹⁹⁾ The gist of the report consisted of three parts: first, deficiencies in Japanese education, including the expansion of education to the masses, the complicated nature of the school system, the presence of many privileged groups in the education system, lack of higher education for women, and the lack of the Normal School training, are cited. Next there is mention made of the fact that the reforms being presently proposed had in fact been proposed approximately ten years earlier by about 100 business, professional, and educational leaders. Nambara himself had initially opposed the plan based on the reason was that he felt that the Japanese school system was not ready for such drastic change. However, he now advocated the reforms in the light of changing circumstances. Lastly, thirteen recommendations for reform are given. Of these, the ones pertaining to the school system are:

- 1) A system of education must be adopted that is designed to reach the masses, to enlighten the people, and to give them democratic ideas;

2) Because of the stranglehold that the *Koto Gakko* (Boys' Higher School) has on the education of Japan it is the real cause of the *Gakubatsu* or educational clique. The fate of a boy is decided when he enters the *Koto Gakko*. They and only they can become the leaders of Japan. Hence he would abolish the *Koto Gakko* and provide a graded system of schools, all of which can lead either to a terminal course or to admission to a university level institution.

3) The differences between the *Semmon Gakko* (colleges for specialised training) and the *Daigaku* (universities with two or more faculties) should be eliminated, and all institutions at the higher level should have the same academic standing.

4) Post-graduate institutes should be established in all universities.

5) The different types of secondary schools should be abolished:

1. All students should undertake the same courses of study for the first nine years of schooling.

2. Students who continue in the secondary school should take elective courses in the final three years.

3. In the upper part of the secondary school, new schools should be established offering diversified courses of study.

6) The educational system should consist of three levels: 6 years elementary school, 6 years secondary school divided into 3 years of junior high school and 3 years of senior high school, and higher school or university (including the present *Daigaku* and *Semmon Gakko*)

At this meeting the 6-3-3 school system suggested by the Japanese Education Committee during the previous meeting with the Mission that morning is more specifically laid out. That is, the 6-3 school system issue was discussed upon the premise that it was a reform plan common to the Mission, Japanese Education Committee and the CI&E. Besides this, there is a private document by Eiji Ushiyama (Principal of Ushigome Seinen Gakko, Ushigome-Ku) titled "Personal Opinions of School System Reform,"²⁰⁾ in which he endorses the 6-3-3-4 school system. The series of moves by the Japan side on behalf of the 6-3-3 reform plan can be seen in the "Report" completed by the Japanese Education Committee after the departure of the Mission and in the first proposal in "Chapter III, Views on the School System" in which the 6-3-3-4 or 6-3-3-5 school system and nine years of compulsory education are endorsed. The second proposal, the 6-2-4 school system, is a substitute suggestion in the event that the nine year compulsory education plan is not feasible. Thus the first plan is the basic reform plan.²¹⁾

The 6-3-3 school system had already been set forth in 1936 by Juko Abe (Professor at Tokyo Imperial University, School System, 1890-1939) in his "Personal Suggestions for School System Reform."²²⁾ Abe himself had been in the

United States from May to July of 1923 and was greatly impressed by the secondary school education reform movement in the U.S. Thus, it is thought that this prewar Japanese school reform plan was carried.

At the time, the *Nippon Times* ²³⁾ editorial of April 11, 1946 reported "the 6-3-3 plan is one which has been advocated by progressive Japanese educators long before the American Education Mission was even thought of."

As is evident from the above records, the Japanese side made active moves towards the adoption of the 6-3-3 school system recommendation.

How did the Mission members who made the 6-3-3 recommendation in the Report regard this issue? Ernest R. Hilgard today gives the following important testimony:

On the recommendation for the 6-3-3 school system, the Mission members were not necessarily unanimously in favor of the recommendation. I personally was opposed to the 6-3-3 school system. That the recommendation for the 6-3-3 school system was made in the Report came as rather a surprise. As is known, the final version of the Report was put entirely into Chairman Stoddard's hands, so it was he who made the final decision. As the person with final responsibility for the Report, I remember that in some matters he was rather 'undemocratic.' In the background of the 6-3-3 school system recommendation is not the desire of the Mission but rather a strong inclination by the Japanese side.

Summary

As can be seen from the above sequence of events, the U.S. Education Mission respected the wishes of the Japanese Education Committee to the greatest degree and drew up the Report based on discussions with the Japanese side. It seems that this attitude was maintained consistently from the time of their departure from Washington to the end of their mission. Afterwards, George Zook, named chairman of the United States Education Mission to Germany, made the following statement pointing out how important cooperation with the Japanese side was:²⁴⁾

It does seem very clear to me that we must work with some group over there, because as has already been said if we were simply to figure out a report and leave it behind for them to pick up, it is entirely possible they wouldn't pick it up at all, and it is possible they wouldn't pick it up in the way they might. I should think that we ought to try to secure the organization of a group which would be continuing thereafter and would have a function thereafter.

According to the explanation by Bowles, one of the conditions of Stoddard's acceptance of the chairmanship of the Mission was a strong request for the

establishment of a group of education specialists on the Japanese side. It turned out that a Japanese Education Committee had already been established by the SCAP's "Committee of Japanese Educators" memorandum, so Stoddard's request did not become public. However, it is evident that his expectations of the Japanese Education Committee were high, as can be seen from his reply addressed to Education Minister Nosei Abe's speech of welcome directly after the Mission's arrival in Japan: "We shall look for what is good in the Japanese educational system... In our policy report we shall then try to strengthen what we jointly feel to be good."²⁵⁾

In fact, Chairman Stoddard, after his return, testified at the Special Subcommittee on Education of the Fourth Committee, Far Eastern Commission in Washington on May 8, 1946 that "many of the recommendations that have been made in the *Report of the U.S. Education Mission to Japan* were actually held by many Japanese leaders in education a long time ago,"²⁶⁾ and further denied that he forced the American school system on Japan. The same statement was made by Mission member Isaac Kandel.²⁷⁾ On this point Bowles has also said, "We considered the content of the Report carefully, always discussing them with the Japanese Education Committee... probably about 60 per cent of the content of the Report comes from the Japanese Education Committee."²⁸⁾

In addition, the meeting between General MacArthur, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and Mission chairman Stoddard is also important. Of course, the objective of the U.S. Education Mission was to make recommendations to the SCAP on postwar educational reform in Japan. At the meeting on March 20th MacArthur told Stoddard that the Mission was not to worry about the financial aspect, and to make recommendations on educational reform freely,²⁹⁾ and it is believed that these words of encouragement by General MacArthur to Stoddard were an important factor in the adoption of the recommendation for a 6-3-3 school system.

In this way, the final recommendation by Stoddard in the Report for the 6-3-3 and not the 6-5 school system was directly motivated by active lobbying by the Japanese side. However, other factors included the fact that the original draft of the 6-5 school system contained aspects conducive to the 6-3-3 school system such as nine years of compulsory education, no tuition fee, and coeducation, that Stoddard himself supported the 6-3-3 school system, and that from his preliminary discussion with MacArthur.

NOTES

- 1) For a detailed discussion of this matter see the following articles: Gary H. Tsuchimochi, "Circumstances of Formation of the First U.S. Education Mission—Study on the U.S. Educational Policy for Japan in the Occupied Period (Part I)" (in Japanese) *Transactions of the Academic Society of the Humanities* (Kokushikan University), Vol. 16, 1984, p. 6

- and also "The Preparation of the Report of the U. S. Education Mission to Japan, March 1946—the Role of the Japanese Education Committee—" (in Japanese) *Journal of the Society for Educational History*, No. 28, 1985, p. 77.
- 2) For a detailed discussion of this matter see the following article: Eiichi Suzuki, Hideo Sato, Gary H. Tsuchimochi and others, "A Comprehensive Study of the Report of the United States Education Mission to Japan, with Particular Reference to the Preparation" (in Japanese) *Bulletin of the Faculty of Education—The Department of Education* (Nagoya University), vol. 31, 1985.
 - 3) The author wishes to thank Dr. Ernest R. Hilgard, Dr. Gordon T. Bowles, Dr. Herbert J. Wunderlich, Dr. Mark T. Orr and Dr. Pearl A. Wanamaker for their most generous assistance in this study. Errors in facts or interpretation are entirely my responsibility.
 - 4) "Tokyo and Return" by Willard E. Givens is a journal which records in a great detail the entire schedule of the First U. S. Education Mission to Japan. This diary is preserved in the archives of the National Education Association, of which Givens was a member. Incidentally, the "Tentative Schedule of U. S. Education Mission" contained in the "Trainor Papers" was prepared before the Mission's actual arrival in Japan and is different in some respects from the actual schedule so that correlation with Givens' journal is necessary. Givens subsequently came to Japan as chairman of the Second U. S. Education Mission, 1950.
 - 5) "Report of Committee III of USEMJ-Administration of Education in Japan at Elementary and Secondary Levels," *Wanamaker Papers*, Box No. 36.
 - 6) It is necessary to keep in mind that this 6-5 school system is not identical to the school system then in effect. Of course, it is common knowledge that the school system then was multi-track; after *Kokumin Gakko Shotoka* (People's Elementary School-six years compulsory) came either the five-year middle school, from which it was possible to pass on to higher educational institutions, and the *Kokumin Gakko Kotoka* (People's Higher Elementary School) or *Seinen Gakko* (Youth School) which were dead ends. When the 6-5 school system is mentioned it points only to the middle school course, which is only a part of the entire system. On this aspect Subcommittee III report recommends a change-over from the *Seinen Gakko* (Youth School) to *Jitsugyo Gakko* (Technical School) and implies the discontinuance of the multi-track system, but since there is no explicit statement of the committee's opinion, the dialogue is rather vague.
 - 7) GHQ/CI&E, Education Division, "Weekly Reports (Oct. 1945-July 15, 1946) 2 Feb. 1946," *Trainor Papers*, Box No. 65.
 - 8) The moves made by the Japanese were translated into English by the CI&E Media Analysis Division in a great detail, and furthermore were reported to the United States as necessary, by the Political Advisor to General MacArthur (POLAD) sent from the State Department. The Media Analysis Division has inserted a magazine article which welcomes the reimplementation of the prewar 6-5 school system. It is noted that Bowles stated that this "Borton Memo" served as the foundation for the Mission Report. ("Bowles Documents;" Yomiuri Shimbun Postwar History Group) (894. 42/3-2246, Subject: Recent Japanese Magazine Articles on Education, Office of the United States Political Advisor, Tokyo, Japan, March 22, 1946-Publication Analysis, 21 February 1946)
 - 9) Gordon T. Bowles, "Comments on Papers Presented at the Fourth Symposium on the Occupation of Japan: Educational and Social Reform," *The Occupation of Japan: Educa-*

tional and Social Reform, ed., Thomas W. Burkman (The MacArthur Memorial, 1982), p. 520.

- 10) Office Memorandum from Hugh Borton to Miss Martin, Secretary of *AD HOC* Reorientation Committee, "Educational System in Japan," December 6, 1945, *SFE/SWNCC Microfilm* No. T-1205, Roll 4.
- 11) "Conference of Advisory Group on Education to Japan, 18 Feb. 1946," *Wanamaker Papers*, Box No. 36.
- 12) In accordance with the intentions of the Potsdam Declaration, the CI&E Education Division had Japan take the lead from an early stage in the invitation of the Mission to Japan. From material recently made available, it is clear that the Ministry of Education had secretly presented a list of 18 educators as desired candidates for the Mission to the CI&E Education Division on October 8, before the CI&E Education Division's announcement on October 19, 1945 of the first proposed list of 18 distinguished American specialists in education as Mission candidates. Included in the list of the Ministry of Education were noted American education specialists such as Paul Monroe, E. L. Thorndike, John Dewey, Charles Beard, and K. T. Compton (President of MIT), as well as world-famous scholars such as the director of the Rousseau Research Center in Switzerland and a former Tokyo Imperial University professor. On this point Education Minister Tamon Maeda indicated that candidates for the Mission were being considered, during an *Asahi Shimbun* round-table discussion on October 3, 1945.
- 13) Gilbert Bowles, Sr. "Notes on the Reconstruction of the Japanese Educational System," *Gildersleeve Papers*.
- 14) "Japanese to Decide Own School Setup by Dr. Willard E. Givens," *Nippon Times*, Tokyo, March 4, 1946.
- 15) "Special Report by Shigeru Nambara, President, Tokyo Imperial University and Chairman of Japanese Committee to G. D. Stoddard, March 21, 1946," *Wanamaker Papers*, Box No. 36.

Nambara later stated that "the contents of the Report to Headquarters which were researched and written on the basis of the American Mission's own viewpoint and observations, coincidentally agreed in large part with the opinions of the Japanese Education Committee." (Shigeru Nambara, "*Nihon ni okeru Kyoiku Kaikaku*" (Education Reform in Japan) in Eiichi Suzuki, ed., *Kyoiku Kihon Ho no Seitei* (The Establishment of the Fundamental Law of Education) (Tokyo: *Gakuyo Shobo* 1977), p. 24.

- 16) *Ibid.*, p. 25.
- 17) "Report of Committee No. 3 Concerning Youth Schools et al.," *Wanamaker Papers*, Box No. 36

The author and date of this report is unknown. However, the basis of the presumption that this report was compiled by Japanese is that its content which corresponds to the functions assigned to Subcommittee III of the Japanese Education Committee, the fact that the authors were well acquainted with the state of things in Japan, the style of English, and the use of the first person singular. In fact, Bowles, who read the original, assumed that the report was definitely not authored by a Mission member but by someone on the Japanese side. Because the report is included in the "Wanamaker Papers," it is supposed that it was presented to the Mission by Subcommittee III of the Japanese Education Com-

mittee.

The "Report" by the Japanese Education Committee that Nambara says "was presented to the American Education Mission and our government as a secret recommendation" (Suzuki, *Ibid.*, p.24) may actually have been still at the draft stage, of which this document was a part. The other document is believed to have been a secret recommendation in English on the Imperial Rescript, "Statement of Japanese Committee No.3 Concerning the Imperial Rescript of Education." In comparing this paper with the "Opinions on the Imperial Rescript of Education" written subsequently by the Japanese Education Committee, there is a sharp difference in content and style; the former being a paper in which the Japanese Education Committee earnestly pleaded for the promulgation of the Imperial Rescript to the Mission members, expressing their position, "In view of the present situation of Japan in [*Sturm und Drang*] the history has never seen before, we, the Japanese members of Committee No. 3, all agree to see a new Imperial Rescript promulgated, along with a new Constitution to be proclaimed in near future," using letterhead with the words "*Dai Nihon Teikoku Seifu*" (Great Japanese Imperial Government) explaining the historical background of the role of the Imperial Rescript of Education and its relation to militarism, and in the end, concluded forcefully with the words, "It is our firm conviction that a New Imperial Rescript will be the most useful instrument that encourages initiative of Japanese educators and realizes the democratization of Japan, thus resulting in the establishment of peaceful Japan." This is also thought to be part of the draft of the "report." ("Statement of Japanese Committee No.3 Concerning the Imperial Rescript of Education," *Wanamaker Papers*, Box No. 36)

Actually, it is thought that the Japanese Education Committee wrote the "Report" in early April, after the departure of the Mission. (Eiichi Suzuki, *Nihon Senryo to Kyoiku Kaikaku* (Occupation in Japan and Educational Reform) (Tokyo: *Keiso Shobo*, 1983)

- 18) Taketoshi Yamagiwa, "The Problem of Elementary School Education," in "Notes-Meeting of U. S. Education Mission and Japanese Committee: at 9:00-11:00 Monday, March 25, 1946," *Trainor Papers*, Box 57.
- 19) "Education Reform-Official Version of Japanese Education Committee," 25 March 1946, 16:00, in Higher Education 1946-1947, *Trainor Papers*, Box 29.
- 20) Eiji Ushiyama, "*Gakko Kyoiku Seido Kaikaku Shiken*" (Personal Views on the School Education System Reform), March 1946 in the *Sanji Aruga Papers* at the Archives of National Institute for Education Research, Tokyo.
- 21) *Beikoku Kyoiku Shisetsudan ni Kyoryoku subeki Nihongawa Kyoiku Iinkai Hokokusho* (Report of the Japanese Education Committee for Cooperation with the U. S. Education Mission) in *Sengo Kyoiku Shiryo* (Records on Postwar Education) at the Archives of National Institute for Education Research, Tokyo.
- 22) Juko Abe, *Gakko Keito Kaikaku no Shian* (Personal Suggestions for School System Reform) in *Abe Juko Chosaku Dai 6 Kan* (Abe Collection, Vol. 6) (Tokyo: *Nihon Tosho Center*, 1983), p.18. Incidentally, the prewar friendship between Japanese Education Committee Member Teizo Toda (Dean, Department of Literature, Tokyo Imperial University, Professor of Sociology, 1887-1955) and Abe is a point to note (See Yasuo Akatsuka, *Shinsei Chugakko Seiritsushi Kenkyu* (Studies on the History of Formation of the New Junior High School System) (Tokyo: *Meiji Tosho*, 1978), pp.68-78.
- 23) "The Educational Report" in *Nippon Times*, Tokyo, Thursday, April 11, 1946, *Gilder-*

steeve Papers.

- 24) "Meeting Advisory Group to Japan, Feb. 8, 1946," *Trainor Papers*, Box No. 55, p. 8.
- 25) "Response to Japanese Minister of Education March 8, 1946 by George D. Stoddard, Chairman, American Education Mission," *Stoddard Papers*, Box No. 3.
- 26) Far Eastern Commission, Box No. 47, *FEC (B)*-0217
- 27) Isaac L. Kandel, "Reorienting Japanese Education," *Educational Forum* IX (November, 1946), p. 17.
- 28) Gary H. Tsuchimochi, "A Study of the Report of the First United States Education Mission to Japan (March 1946), with Particular Reference to the Preparation of the Report" (in Japanese) *Bulletin of Japan Comparative Education Society*, Vol. 10, March 1984, p. 32.
- 29) "Notes on Conference with General MacArthur (Andrews, Bowles and G. D. Stoddard) at General MacArthur's Office, Dai Ichi Building, Tokyo, March 20, 1946," *Stoddard Papers*, Box No. 1.

[Remark: The discovery of the "Wanamaker Papers" occurred when the author visited the University of Washington in February of 1983 to interview former CI&E Education Division member James I. Doi (then Dean, College of Education, University of Washington) as part of the study on education reform during the Occupation and was informed by Dr. Doi that the Wanamaker Papers had been donated to the University.]

占領下における日本の教育改革 —米国教育使節団報告書と戦後教育改革—

土持ゲーリー法—

1946年3月上旬、連合国軍最高司令官マッカーサー元帥の要請にもとづいて、アメリカを代表する著名な教育者27名が日本に派遣された。米国教育使節団は当時日本の教育改革にたずさわっていた連合国軍最高司令官総司令部民間情報教育局（GHQ/CIE）および日本側教育家委員会との協力によって、約1ヶ月間日本の諸学校を視察、教育関係者との協議を経て、3月30日に『第一次米国教育使節団報告書』をマッカーサーに提出した。報告書は4月7日に公表され、戦後日本の教育改革を方向づけるのに決定的な役割を果たした。この報告書は、教育の中央集権化を警め、文部省の権限を地方分権化し、さらに成人教育の機会を豊富にすべきことなどを奨励した。なかでも基本的な意義をもったのは、学校制度の改革であって、使節団が勧告した六・三・三制の改革案は画期的なものであった。

周知のとおり、『第一次米国教育使節団報告書』の第三章「初等及び中等学校の教育行政」では戦前の複線型学校体系を単一化し、六・三・三制による九ヶ年義務制、男女共学、総合制高校などの学制改革案を勧告している。

しかし、この新学制がどのような経緯の下で『報告書』の中で勧告されるに至ったのかについては今日まで資料的な制約から必ずしも明らかにされていないばかりか、その成立経緯に関しては種々の見解があり、占領軍による一方的な「押しつけ」であるとの「俗論」さえもある。

中曽根元首相はアメリカ占領軍に指導された六・三・三制をはじめとする学制改革は、日本の文化・風土に適合したものではなく、今日の教育の「荒廃」の原因でもあり、40年を経た戦後教育を「総決算」する必要があるとして、首相直属の臨時教育審議会を設置し、その改革のための答申をまとめた。

本論では、「トレーナー文書」「ストッダード文書」などのほか、これまで未公開だった「ワナメーカー文書」の第一次史料にもとづいて、さらに文部省科学研究費海外学術調査を踏まえて、六・三・三制の成立事情の具体的な経緯について実証的に究明し、六・三制が日本側の主体的な導入による学校制度であることを実証した。