

Education Reform under the American Occupation (3)

— Report of the United States Education Mission to Japan
and the Reform of the Japanese Language —

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Introduction

Under the American Occupation the suggestion was made that in the light of post-war democratization, the Japanese traditional writing system ought to be changed into a simplified form by the adoption of *Romaji* in postwar Japanese elementary schools and the joint use of Japanese with *Romaji* in school textbooks

As is generally known, Chapter II of the *Report of the United States Education Mission to Japan*,¹⁾ entitled "Language Reform" states:

The Mission believes that in time *Kanji* should be wholly abandoned in the popular written language and that a phonetic system should be adopted ... In the judgment of the Mission, there are more advantages to *Romaji* than to *Kana*. Furthermore, it would lend itself well to the growth of democratic citizenship and international understanding.

Thus, in taking up the issue of the language reform, they advocated the total abolition of *Kanji*, instituting instead the adoption of phonetic notation and *Romaji* for general use, and they recommended that committees and research institutes be set up in order to achieve this great national undertaking.

Until now, due to the restrictions relating to historical documents information concerning the drafting of Chapter II, the kinds of discussions and research that were carried out, and those who were directly in charge, have not been revealed.

However, recently the unpublished draft of Chapter II by the Special Committee on Language was discovered in the *David H. Stevens Papers*, which have been kept in the Joseph Regenstein Library, Rare Books and Special Collections in the University of Chicago.²⁾

This draft presented several recommendations, such as the adoption of *Romaji* in postwar Japanese elementary schools and the joint use of Japanese with *Romaji* in school textbooks.

The purpose of this paper is to analyze and verify details of the drafting process of Chapter II as well to examine why the Japanese language reform failed, by referring to primary historical documents such as, *the David H. Stevens Papers*, *the Joseph C. Trainor Papers*, and *the George D. Stoddard Papers*. Additionally, the paper includes interviews with Gordon T. Bowles, who held the key to the formulation of the Report as



U. S. Education Mission Members, David Stevens, Gordon T. Bowles, Emily Woodward and others [Robert W. Woodruff Library, Emory University]

an adviser to the Mission on behalf of the Department of State, and with Herbert J. Wunderlich, Textbooks Officer, Education Division, CI&E Section.

I. The Civil Information and Education Section of the General Headquarters (GHQ/CI&E) and the Language Reform

With regard to the issue of the language reform under the Occupation, Robert K. Hall is accepted by most researchers as a leading figure in the CI&E. His enthusiastic support for Japanese language reform was noticeable even before the Mission's arrival in Japan. For instance, in the early summer of 1945, when he was still Chief of the Education Section of the Planning Staff for the Occupation of Japan at Civil Affairs Staging Area (CASA) in Monterey, California, he had already proposed a plan relating to the abolition of *Kanji*. In fact, on June 23, 1945, Hall sent Major General John H. Hilldring, Director, Civil Affairs Division, War Department, a five-page memorandum titled "The Exclusive Use of *Katakana* as Official Written Japanese."³⁾ In this memorandum, he suggests that only *Katakana* be sanctioned for use in Japan under the Occupation: "It is recommended that all written communication in the Japanese language during military occupation be restricted to *Katakana*, and that the use of materials in *Kanji* be prohibited."

In making this proposal, Hall enumerates its advantages as follows:

1. Prohibiting *Kanji* would greatly assist in barring access to prewar propaganda.
2. The exclusive use of *Katakana* would ease the problem of censorship.

3. The use of *Katakana* would shorten the time required for children to reach the same proficiency level in schools.
4. *Katakana* would increase national business efficiency.

Although Hilldring tended to lean towards these proposals, on July 3, 1945, he sent Hall's memorandum to Eugene H. Dooman, who was in charge of Japan in the Division of Far East Affairs in the Department of State, in order to seek his opinion.⁴⁾ Dooman sent back his reply on July 6, 1945, pointing out that Hall's description of the Japanese language was inaccurate and that his proposal should not be implemented because it would be extremely restrictive in relation to intellectual and cultural studies, and concluded as follows:

It is our view that the prohibition of Chinese characters could not be enforced. Even if it could be, the elimination of Chinese characters under conditions of military occupation would probable have consequences of a most serious and *far-reaching character*, not only in drastically limiting intellectual and cultural pursuits, but in impeding in most drastic form the operation of the normal economy of the country. (Italics mine)

Eventually, the War Department officially rejected Hall's proposal on July 11, 1945. Thus, his original plan concerning reform of the Japanese language was rejected before he was assigned his post in Japan. However, the idea did not die. This setback did not deter Hall from working for the reform later in Japan and making converts of many members of the U. S. Education Mission in March 1946.⁵⁾

When Hall came to Japan, he discovered debate on the reform of the Japanese language in Japan already under way, but, rather than preferring *Katakana*, most people favored *Romaji*. Once again, Hall became very enthusiastic about the reforms. But this time, he made a complete reversal of his initial proposal and accepted the idea of changing to *Romaji*.

During the process of investigation, on November 20, 1945, Hall discussed the romanization of school textbooks and their revision with Jiro Arimitsu, Chief of the Bureau of Textbooks and an administrative official. The result was the creation of new type of textbook, which arose from "The Supervision and Policy to Japanese Educational System," one of the Four Negative Directives for educational reform issued by SCAP on October 22, 1945. In that meeting, Hall gave the following reasons for proposing the romanization of school textbooks:⁶⁾

The reasons for asking that textbooks be written in *Romaji* are the following. It will be easier for foreigners to read Japanese. It will be easier for the Japanese common people to read laws and newspapers and become thereby really literate. You should prepare the *Romaji* in the vernacular and in the classical style.

After a prior consultation with Tamon Maeda, the Minister of Education, Harold G. Henderson, Chief of the Education Division of CI&E declared that he had no inten-

tion of issuing an order to romanize textbooks. In fact, Henderson objected to Roman letter because he felt that the only way of making any real lasting reforms that was to take something that originated among the Japanese themselves rather than imposing an American idea.⁷⁾

This disagreement between Henderson and Hall showed that views were not entirely consistent within CI&E. Subsequently, General MacArthur called for a reorganization of the Education Division of CI&E claiming it had created unnecessary confusion among the Japanese people over this issue, and also for nominating James. B. Conant, the President of Harvard University as candidate for chairman of the Mission against General MacArthur's will.

Hall was forced to hand the textbook issue over to Wunderlich and was himself reassigned in the Planning Division. He was also relieved of operational duties and liaison with the Ministry of Education, as well. In order to resolve the confusion concerning romanization, Lt. Col. Donald R. Nugent was appointed as Chief of Education Division of CI&E, succeeding Henderson who was to become a Special Adviser on December 10, 1945. This confusion over romanization continued until Nugent told Shigeru Fukuda, a liaison officer, that the romanization of textbooks was unnecessary, effective December 14, 1945.⁸⁾ Thus, at this point, the issue of the romanization of textbooks was officially ended.

However, Hall, who still adhered to idea a reform of the Japanese language through the adoption of romanization, began secretly to prepare to have his proposal adopted by the Mission, which was to arrive in Japan at the beginning of March of the following year. On November 12, 1945 a staff investigation and staff study on the entire problem of simplifying the written language was begun in a confidential way, but personnel from the Central News Agency, a semi-official Chinese organ, learned of the official study and without consulting any representative of Headquarters conducted a private investigation through Japanese sources. On January 18, 1946 this agency filed a story, "Plans to replace present way of writing Nippon language by alphabet," which was published widely throughout China. The reaction in Occupation Headquarters, when press clippings from China arrived, bordered on alarm.⁹⁾ However, on March 4, 1946, two days before the Mission's arrival, Hall completed a staff study titled "A Tentative Study: Japanese Written Language Revision Study."¹⁰⁾ It consisted of 44 typed pages, 35 appendixes and 260 references and was quite a persuasive document. They presented the Japanese language problems as follows:

An educated and literate citizenry is the fundamental prerequisite of any form of representative government or democratic society. Despite impressive official claims of an extremely high rate of literacy, the majority of Japanese people are actually unable to read anything beyond the simplest of the written form of the Japanese language, rather than the absence of an adequate system of compulsory education, is the cause. No extension of the compulsory educational level which is practical in the foreseeable future can resolve the diffi-

culty. The development and adoption of a radically simplified writing system would provide a solution.

In this study, they emphasize the importance of reforming the Japanese language, not from the viewpoint of censorship, but rather from the necessity for the democratization of Japan, as "the Occupation have recognized the impossibility of democratizing education and of establishing a truly representative government while the present language system is retained." It is obvious that Hall focused the study in such a way as to gain support from the Mission.

This time, Hall attempted to mold his ideas in accordance with the aims of the Headquarters, which were to accomplish the democratization of Japan through reform of the Japanese language, quoting from the provision in the Potsdam Declaration, which specified: "the Japanese government shall remove all obstacles to the revival and strengthening of democratic tendencies among the Japanese people."

In regard to this staff study, Nugent, Acting Chief of CI&E Section, issued a strict memorandum prohibiting Hall from giving any conclusions or proposals concerning the problem of romanization.¹¹⁾ Accordingly, Hall, reluctantly, only suggested the problem briefly to the Mission in the orientation session.

The reason why Hall still persisted in pressing for reform of the Japanese language, may have been due to the fact that in his graduate student days, he was strongly influenced by Charles C. Fries, a professor at the University of Michigan. Professor Fries was a prominent linguist who contributed to English education in postwar Japan and his special subject was language simplification.¹²⁾ As a result of obtaining the inclusion in the Report his recommendation for language reform through the Romanization of the Japanese language, Hall managed to become promoted at Columbia University. In fact, GHQ Education Section staff members were opposed to the language reform as proposed by Hall.¹³⁾

II. *The Mission and the Japanese Language Reform*

The paper will now focus on the Mission's attitude towards Japanese language reform. Before its arrival in Japan, the Mission had preparatory meetings in Washington, Hawaii and Guam. According to historical documents, it was at the meeting in Washington on February 19, 1946, that the first description of the Japanese language reform appeared. However, they did not discuss it concretely at that time. Why did the Mission touch upon language reform? On January 9, 1946, SCAP issued a memorandum to the Japanese government on the subject of the Committee of Japanese Educators. According to the memorandum, the Mission was to study the language "revision" and submit reports and recommendations to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers upon completion of the mission. They originally used the term Japanese language "revision," rather than "reform."

At the Guam meeting on March 3, 1946, chairman Stoddard prepared a memorandum titled "Part II on Preparing the Report,"¹⁴⁾ in which he recorded that five mem-

bers who were interested in Japanese language reform were chosen to form a subcommittee. They were Isaac L. Kandel appointed as chairman, Leon Carnovsky, Thomas V. Smith, George S. Counts and Gordon T. Bowles.

At their first meeting with the Japanese Education Committee which took place on March 9, 1946, following their arrival in Japan, Kandel mentioned Japanese language reforms only briefly, as follows: ¹⁵⁾

The members of the subcommittee do not have possess any abilities to recommend the language reform ... On the issue of the language reform, a responsible authority will be needed.

On March 11, 1946, two special committees were organized within the Mission in order to prepare the draft for the Report. One was a Special Committee on Language, in which T. V. Smith, I. L. Kandel and L. Carnovsky were removed from the original subcommittee and replaced by Charles H. McCroy, David H. Stevens and William C. Trow. Counts was appointed chairman. The other was a Special Committee on Drafting, which consisted of the following seven members: George D. Stoddard, chairman, Harold Benjamin, Gordon T. Bowles, Virginia C. Gildersleeves, I. L. Kandel, T. V. Smith and Willard E. Givens. ¹⁶⁾ Only Bowles belonged to both special committees.

On March 16, 1946, the Special Committee on Drafting prepared a paper titled, "Proposed Outline of the Report." ¹⁷⁾ Therein, they formally decided to include Japanese language reform as an official provision in part II of the Report, under the title, "An Evaluation of the Problem of Reforming the Written Language." In the evening of March 24, 1946, all subcommittees in the Mission gathered for a general meeting in order to submit their drafts and discuss them. At this meeting, Counts, chairman of the Special Committee on Language presented the Committee's proposals and submitted a draft.

III. The Draft by the Special Committee on Language and the Japanese Language Reform

This section examines the recommendations included in the draft presented by the Special Committee on Language. It begins with the following statement:

The question of language reform is basic and urgent. It emerges in almost every branch of the educational program from the primary school to the university. *If this question is evaded, many of the proposals made in this report will be practically impossible of achievement and the development of democracy in Japan will be seriously hampered.* (Italics mine)

It points out the importance of the Japanese language reform and discusses it by giving many examples in detail as to how the Japanese language as it stands interferes with Japanese school education. It also refers to the example of the simplification of *Kanji* in China, "It is significant that in the past China has evolved phonetic symbols, acting quite independently, designed to simplify the Chinese language, and that now

Chinese scholars are deeply concerned with ways to improve their language for all the purposes of modern communication." This obviously reflects the chairman's view, as a professor of comparative education at Columbia University. Conclusively, it recommends as follows:

With this conviction, *the Mission recommends the introduction of some form of Romaji into all elementary schools and the preparation of textbooks in two language forms.* The two forms might appear on the same page, as in several texts now in circulation, or on opposite pages. Choice in this aspect of the plan should be made by printers and specialists in the subjects taught. Also, the Japanese who themselves have the true feeling for the most desirable form of language now in common use should determine what form *Romaji* and what blend of *Kanji* and *Kana* would best serve the needs of pupils at a given level.

The making of these decisions might be the work of the Japanese language commission and a similar body might determine at what level in the elementary schools the new texts would be made available to all pupils in the country. The textbooks in two language forms might be prepared for the first three, for the last three, or for all six years of the elementary school. Such texts should be made standard for the entire country, at the same time provision should be made for the publication of newspapers, periodicals, and books, in whole or in part, in *Romaji*. An interesting and exciting children's literature in the new language form would be helpful. In order to speed the reform, children and youths might be prepared to give instructions in *Romaji* to their elders in the family and the community. (*Italics mine*)

However, the above portion of the draft was deleted from the final Report (March 30, 1946). Instead, the final Report begins with these words: "We come now to a matter which both modesty and ease would counsel us to avoid, if our sense of responsibility to the children of Japan permitted ... From a deep sense of duty, and from it alone, we recommend a drastic reform of the Japanese written language." From this wording, we can read that George D. Stoddard, chairman of the Mission, and Gordon T. Bowles, completed this part of the Japanese language reform with much hesitation.

Furthermore, the main recommendation which originally read: "the introduction of some form of *Romaji* into all elementary schools and the preparation of textbooks in two language forms," was changed to a more flexible interpretation of the recommendations:

- 1) That some form of *Romaji* be brought into common use by all means possible.
- 2) That the particular form of *Romaji* chosen be decided upon by a commission of Japanese scholars, educational leaders, and statesmen.
- 3) That the commission assume responsibility for coordinating the program of language reform during the transitional stages.

- 4) That the commission formulate a plan and a program for introducing *Romaji* into the schools and into the life of the community and nation through newspapers, periodicals, books, and other writings.
- 5) That the commission study, also, the means of bringing about a more democratic form of the spoken language.
- 6) That in view of the steady drain on the learning-time of children, the commission be formed promptly. It is hoped that a thorough report and a comprehensive program may be announced within a reasonable period.

IV. *The Draft of the Japanese Language Reform by Japanese Educators*

How did the Japanese Education Committee deal with this issue? In regard to "The problem of Romanization," in part (3) "National Language Question," of the Recommendations of the Japanese Education Committee for Cooperation with the U.S. Education Mission, the Committee gives its view as follows:

It is all right for elementary school students to study "*Romaji*" (western alphabet) ; but *we cannot agree to the system of mixing "Romaji" with "Kanji" and "Kana" in horizontal style in elementary school textbooks, with the view of eventually replacing all characters and "Kana" with "Romaji."* It is still too early for this move.

Even with the study of "*Romaji*" it is difficult as well as undesirable to conduct it nationally in a uniform manner. There are differences between cities and villages. Whatever the case may be, it is probably more suitable to let the school principal decide according to local conditions. (Italics mine)

Thus, the Committee states its opposition to reforming school textbooks in lateral lines with *Romaji*; nevertheless, it presents its view that *Romaji* is appropriate to be taught in elementary schools.¹⁸⁾ As we have seen from the fact that the Central News Agency had released a story on January 18, 1946 on "Plans to replace present way of writing Nippon language by alphabet," the Japanese Education Committee knew of the Occupation's intention to force the romanization of the Japanese language, and knew also that the special Committee on Language in the Mission was to prepare the draft in line with this policy. In other words, this recommendation by the Japanese Education Committee shows its strong reaction to the above intentions on the U.S. side, and it seems that their views influenced the draft made by the Special Committee on Language in the Mission.

By the time of the Mission's arrival in Japan, Shigeru Nambara, the president of Tokyo Imperial University, had proposed to form a Research Committee on Education System at Tokyo Imperial University to discuss the need for adjusting their own views concerning education reform in parallel with discussions within the Japanese Education Committee. On March 2, 1946, the first meeting was held,¹⁹⁾ and they also discussed the problem of the reform of the Japanese language and its written form. On March 12, 1946, they submitted the report to the president which stated:

The reform of Japanese language and its written form should be implemented now, for the progress of Japanese culture. The Japanese language should be a language which is understood on hearing. The written form should be combined with *Kanji* as a main structure. Numbers in *Kanji* should be limited and letters of homonyms should be rearranged. Restriction on the use of *Kanji* should be implemented not only school, but also, by the same policy, newspapers, magazines and books should be published within the restrictions on *Kanji*. The reform of the written language is intended to promote a use of the phonetic system and encourage the use of *Kana* and spread *Romaji*. Regarding the use of *Kana* to express Chinese sounds, *Kana* should be used phonetically, and regarding the use of *Kana* to express Japanese words, the historical method should be employed. An institution of the Japanese language should be set up in Tokyo Imperial University, in order to reform the Japanese language by studying its problems. Accordingly, it could contribute to Japanese language reform with academic proposals, through continuous studies and the cooperation of scholars and other intellectuals.

It seems that summary of this report on the question of the Japanese language was given through the Japanese Education Committee to the Mission, which was also taking up this issue.²⁰⁾ On the issue of the language reform, the Research Committee on Education System at Tokyo Imperial University influenced the Recommendations of the Japanese Education Committee. We can see that it offered suggestions for the Mission's final Report.

Summary

Why was the original draft of the Japanese language reform moderated in the final *Report*? As a matter of fact, the person who insisted on moderating the content of the draft was Gordon T. Bowles, an adviser to the Mission and a representative of the Department of State. He opposed the romanization of *Kanji* in written Japanese, and he insisted that reform of the Japanese language should be left strictly to the Japanese without outside interference.

When this writer showed Bowles the draft by the Special Committee on Language, he confirmed that it was certainly a part of the draft. He also verified that as an adviser to the Mission, he had given his comments straightforwardly, as follows: ²¹⁾

- 1) It was not necessarily correct to assume that the low percentage (10%) of pupils continuing their education beyond the elementary level was attributable solely to the complexities of the written language. The blame should be placed in large part on the elitist type of society and the assumption that learning even at the secondary level should be limited to those designated to enter academic, political or administrative positions.
- 2) The Japanese written language is already provided with two alternative phonetic scripts. Learning *Romaji* should definitely be required, but the pri-

mary purpose should be to provide the child with the basic script of western European languages and westernized Japanese rather than to use it for textbooks.

- 3) Such a fundamental change as altering the method of writing should be determined by the Japanese themselves. Would it not be more appropriate to demand that serious consideration be given to the adoption of *Romaji* by the newly established Language Commission?

Concerning the final Report, Bowles commented as follows: ²²⁾

Strong feelings were expressed by the proponents of *Romaji*... that the Report should read: 'That some form of *Romaji* *must* be brought into common use by all means possible.' It was my contention that use of the word *must* was more of a command than a recommendation and that the word *should* might be more appropriate. A compromise was reached by dropping both words. I could see no objection to the final wording, since it would certainly be advantageous to every child to be able to cope with *Romaji*.

I remember, also, that in considering the Commission for Language Reform, its functions came under considerable debate, and that those of us who urged moderation did manage to have deleted from the final wording any suggestion that an immediate adoption of *Romaji* in school textbooks should be made mandatory or even given priority consideration.

The flat statement is made in the Final Report that there are more advantages to *Romaji* than to *Kana*, but no reasons were given for this pronouncement. Presumably it was because it opened the way to a study of occidental languages. No mention was made of the value of *Kana* as a collective phonetic symbol or a syllabic sound grouping as opposed to the alphabetical qualities of *Romaji*. It is my memory that the usefulness of *Furigana* was never understood. It was perceived more as a shortcut or abbreviation rather than a simplified phonetic cluster equivalent. (*Italics mine*)

At the same time, Bowles described the objections to his suggestions. For instance, William Benton, the Assistant Secretary of State, showed his disappointment with Bowles' assertion and his influence on the writing of the draft. That is to say, Benton strongly supported romanization of the school textbooks as a convenient means of promoting democratization and improving educational standards.

The Mission had been strongly influenced by CI&E (especially, Hall) with respect to the Japanese language reform. In an interview, Wunderlich, recalling those days, stressed that there were no specialists in linguistics in the Mission²³⁾ and hinted that the Japanese language reform had been originally prepared by the initiative of CI &E. There were quite a number of members in the Mission who were influenced by Hall's views on romanization of the Japanese language. George S. Counts, chairman of the Special Committee on Language was no exception. Gordon T. Bowles recalled that

Counts and Stevens spent much time with Hall in this connection.²⁴⁾ Accordingly, in the process of completing the section of the Japanese language reform in the Final Report, Hall showed his personal objection to Bowles, which he described as follows:²⁵⁾

I agreed with the idea of teaching some form of *Romaji* in elementary school. However, I opposed its romanization, especially a drastic change of Japanese written language. The matter of the language reform had to be decided by Japanese themselves, not by outsiders. This is nothing to do with the Occupation nor the war itself. This is a matter of the Japanese culture and arts. Such drastic reform of Japanese language is not only undesirable but also to be our fault. That is why I disagreed with it. Hall was so mad and expressed his anger, 'you will realize that you were wrong forever. All Japanese children will be sacrificed forever not to learn the romanized Japanese language that I proposed,' which was contrary to my opinion.

And according to his memoirs, "Reflections on the March 1946 U.S. Education Mission to Japan:"²⁶⁾

The majority of the Mission members and especially George Stoddard, chairman of the Mission, as well as my superior, Assistant Secretary of State William Benton, sincerely believed that forcing a child to master between one and two thousand characters would definitely have a crippling effect on the child's education and impose an unwarranted burden on the whole educational process. I can at least take satisfaction in knowing that *the results of my last minute efforts did produce a tempering effect on the wording of the Report and that, instead of recommending that all elementary textbooks be written in Romaji, or Latin script, it was simply urged that some form of writing be given careful consideration.* I felt at the time that recommending a committee or commission to study the matter of simplification of writing was a major victory. (Italics mine)

This testimony is important in understanding the process of drafting the Japanese language reform. And in particular, his memoirs are worthy of attention, because they had been written before the draft was discovered in the *David H. Stevens Papers*.

As we can see above, the draft drawn up by the Special Committee on language was not reflected in the final Report because of Bowles' objection. Though the Report of the Mission became the starting point for postwar educational reform in Japan, the "Language Reform" Section in the Report was not implemented, like the 6-3-3 school system and many other reforms in education, for the following reasons: First of all, in publicizing the Report of the Mission, General MacArthur gave the "Statement" on April 7, 1946, in which he suppressed the recommendation, commenting: "Some of the recommendations regarding education principles and *language reform are so far reaching* that they can only serve as a guide for long range study and future planning." (Italics mine) Secondly, Lt. Col. Donald R. Nugent, Chief of Education Division of CI&E Section, did not totally agree with all the contents of the chapter on Japanese language

reform. On April 30, 1946 Brig. Gen. Ken R. Dyke, the Chief of CI&E, was called to testify before the Allied Council for Japan, Tokyo representatives of the Far Eastern Commission. During the meeting he was questioned as to official policy regarding the elimination of *Kanji* character from the Japanese writing system by China's representative, Lt. Gen. Chu Shih-ming. Dyke had been in the United States on leave at the time of the U. S. Education Mission to Japan and had been represented by his deputy and later successor, Nugent. Although the Report had unequivocally recommended revision and the adoption of *Romaji*, Dyke's reply to the question of the Chinese representative, as reported in the May 1, 1946 *Pacific Stars and Stripes*, was that language reform was a matter which the Japanese themselves would have to decide.²⁷⁾ As a result, the Department of State, the head of CI&E, and above all General MacArthur himself, all believed it unwise to impose such a drastic reform unless it first won widespread support among the Japanese.²⁸⁾ Finally, the Japanese Education Committee strongly opposed the romanization of school textbooks.

This paper has focussed on Chapter II, "Language Reform," in the *Report of the U. S. Education Mission to Japan*," and describes the process by which it was drafted. The Mission's attitude towards education reform in Japan was maintained in accordance with the Potsdam Declaration which specified "the revival and strengthening" of democratic tendencies. They had the greatest regard for the intentions of the Japanese Education Committee and formulated the Report through discussions with Japanese educators, leaving the initiative with them.

However, a quite a number of the members within the Mission criticized the modification of the plan for the romanization of the Japanese language. For example, one of the members, Wilson M. Compton, wrote in his letter addressed to William Benton, Assistant Secretary of State, after his return to the U. S., saying: ²⁹⁾

I think that fundamentally that recommendation is more important than all the rest because *without the language reform the other reforms in my judgment cannot be fully effective*. I personally would have preferred a much stronger statement on language reform in our report and a stronger challenge to the Japanese to do something about it. (Italics mine)

Also, William C. Trow, one of the members of the Special Committee on Language, in his unpublished memoirs, expressed his dissatisfaction as follows: ³⁰⁾

A final question of general interest was that of recommending that *Romaji* be officially adopted and serve as the written language of instruction. Robert King Hall was convinced that now was the time for this change, that it was possible, since Turkey had actually taken the equivalent step ... the head of CI &E was sensitive to pressures and had consistently opposed the change, so we did what I suppose was the most politic thing — recommended that *Romaji* be taught in the schools if so desired, along with the Japanese characters ... I regretted that our committee did not take a definite stand and suggest a possi-

ble implementation that Hall had worked out, and then leave it to the Japanese decide.

It is interesting to note that Trow was a faculty member at the University of Michigan while Hall was a graduate student there, and they were on friendly terms.

Finally, George D. Stoddard, chairman of the Mission, and also William Benton, Assistant Secretary of State, were quite favorably inclined to romanization for the democratization of postwar Japan. Furthermore, Stoddard was responsible for a great deal of the desired simplification that were made in the language, and numerous drafts were made before the final copy was submitted to General MacArthur. As a result, we need to view the Chapter II of the Report, "Language Reform" reflects considerable hesitation on the part of those people involved in the process of drafting it.

The Department of State drew up as policy statement on educational revisions based on the Report of the U. S. Education Mission. It submitted it to the Far Eastern Commission and on March 27, 1947 it was approved and published as, "Policy for the Revision of the Japanese Educational System." It included every important recommendation made by the U. S. Education Mission, with one significant exception. On language reform there was not a single word.³¹⁾

The U. S. Education Mission recommended the introduction of *Romaji* into the schools. However, the Japanese only used the *Romaji* for the simplification of the Japanese language along the lines proposed in the Recommendation of the Japanese Education Committee.

NOTES

- 1) The U. S. Education Mission was sent to Japan twice, in March 1946 and August 1950. The Mission in 1950 was officially called "The Second U. S. Education Mission to Japan." Accordingly, later, the Mission in 1946 became to be called "The First U. S. Education Mission to Japan" for convenience.

For a detailed discussion of the formation of the First U. S. Education Mission to Japan, see following articles: Eiichi Suzuki, Hideo Sato, Gary H. Tsuchimochi and others, "A Comprehensive Study of the *Report of the United States Education Mission to Japan*, with Particular Reference to the Preparation" (In Japanese), *Bulletin of the Faculty of Education: The Department of Education, Nagoya University*, Vol. 31, 1985.

- 2) Two documents on the draft of reform with *Romaji* are kept at the Joseph Regenstein Library. One is a six-page document titled "Language Reform," on which "The second draft by Stevens and Counts" was written by hand. The other is also a six-page document, titled "language," and "The third draft by Stevens and Counts" was added by hand, as well. From those drafts, it can be said that the drafts of "Language Reform" by the Special Committee on Language were prepared by Counts, chairman and Stevens, a member of the committee. Both drafts have more or less identical contents. However, referring to the final Report, the structure of the content is closer to the second draft. Accordingly, it is supposed that the

- second draft was actually submitted to George D. Stoddard, chairman of the Mission.
- 3) 894.402/7-345 Robert K. Hall, "The Exclusive Use of *Katakana* as Official Written Japanese," (23 June 1945, S-5 Education, CASA, Presidio of Monterey) *National Archives*
A previous study on this subject is Harry Wray and Kanji Katsuoka, "A Cooperative Study of the Occupation Policy on Japanese Language Reform (Part I)," (in Japanese) *Research Bulletin of Educational History of the Allied Occupation of Japan* (Educational History of the Occupation, Research Center, Meisei University), Vol. 3, 1986.
 - 4) 894.402/7-345, Letter, from John H. Hilldring to Eugene H. Dooman, 3 July 1945 and from Eugene H. Dooman to John H. Hilldring, July 6, 1945.
 - 5) Marlene J. Mayo, "Psychological Disarmament: American Wartime Planning for the Education and Re-education of Defeated Japan, 1943-1945" in *The Occupation of Japan: Educational and Social Reform*, ed. by Thomas W. Burkman (Norfolk: The MacArthur Memorial, 1980), p. 70.
 - 6) Herbert J. Wunderlich, "Reminiscences of Occupation Japan, 1945-1946" (unpublished, 1984), p. 33.
 - 7) *The Reminiscences of Harold C. Henderson* (Typescript) Oral History Research Office, Columbia University, 1962, p. 35.
 - 8) Wunderlich, "Reminiscences," p. 35.
 - 9) Robert K. Hall, *Education for a New Japan* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1949), pp. 354-355.
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- 27) Hall, *Education for a New Japan*, pp. 355-356.
- 28) Mayo, "Psychological Disarmament," pp. 69-70.
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占領下における日本の教育改革

—米国教育使節団報告書と言語改革—

土持ゲーリー法一

戦後日本の小学校でローマ字が採用され、その教科書に日本語およびローマ字の併用が義務づけられたとしたら日本の学校教育にどのような変化をおよぼしたであろうか。

1946年3月に来日した第一次米国教育使節団がマッカーサーに提出した『報告書』は戦後日本の教育の原典となったのであるが、実は、教育使節団の中で言語改革を検討していた言語特別委員会は草案で上記のような抜本的な言語改革を勧告していたという事実が最近の史料発掘によって明らかにされたのである。

本稿では、この言語改革の草案が教育使節団の誰によって、どのような経緯で準備・作成されたのかを究明する。また、その草案はなぜ最終『報告書』で緩和されたのかについても考察する。

1947年3月27日、極東委員会は「日本教育制度に関する政策」を決定した。この中では教育使節団が『報告書』で提示した多くの重要な勧告が政策として決定された。しかし、言語改革は含まれることはなかった。なぜ、言語改革は実施されなかったのかについて、国務省の政策、連合国軍総司令部民間情報局内の意見の不一致とくにマッカーサーの反対、日本側教育委員会からの反発、教育使節団員ボールの役割などから考察する。また、言語改革の中心的存在であったGHQ／CI&Eのロバート・K・ホールがいつから、そしてなぜこれほどまでに言語改革に関心を示したのかについても考察する。